

# Are CEOs paid extra for riskier pay packages?

Albuquerque-Albuquerque-Carter-Dong

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# Compensating Differentials for Risk

“Theory” predicts that risk-averse CEOs will demand compensating differentials for accepting risky pay packages

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Authors consider 3 approaches

Simulations based on performance metrics in incentive plans (Incentive Lab)

$E[\text{Pay}] = \text{Mean}[\text{TDC1}]$ ,  $\text{Var}[\text{Pay}] = \text{Var}[\text{TDC1}]$

$E[\text{Pay}]$  and  $\text{Var}[\text{Pay}]$  based ARCH estimates using TDC1

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Apparently, our theories need updating ...



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“A *fundamental hypothesis* in moral hazard models is that risk-averse CEOs require extra pay for riskier pay packages”

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This paper shows that we’ve taken the risk-aversion story too seriously

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Does Agency Theory require the CEO’s participation constraint to be binding?

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One way to model:

$\text{MAX}_{w(y)} (y - w(y))$  subject to

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Another way to model:


$$\begin{aligned} & \text{MAX}_{w(y)} E[U(w(y), a)] \text{ subject to} \\ & \text{MAX}_a U(w(y), a) \\ & E[y - w(y)] = 0 \end{aligned}$$

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
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


# Approach I: Simulations

Non-Equity Incentives (24% of Pay)




Restricted Stock (15% of Pay)




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
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


Stock Options (13% of Pay)




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
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
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
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
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
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Over 90% of firms use non-GAAP or adjusted measures. How does this affect  $\text{Var}(\text{Bonus})$ ?




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


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
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
Missing values for goals may not be random

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


# Approach I: Simulations

Easiest to model how  $\text{Var}(\text{Stock Price})$   
translates to  $\text{Var}(\text{RSUs})$  ... but you  
seem to ignore time-lapse  
restricted shares




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


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Straightforward to model how  $\text{Var}(\text{Stock Price})$  translates to  $\text{Var}(\text{Options}) \dots$   
but is this what you are doing?



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




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
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\$ Value



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


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
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


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
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Why aren't you simulating stock prices  
directly (rather through a multiple  
of sales)?

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


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


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
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
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# Approach 2: Realized Var(TDC1)

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Both have  $\text{Var}[\text{TDC1}] = 0$ , but CEO #2's pay is riskier

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Actual bonus rather than expected or target bonus

Black-Scholes is not the “expected value” of options, etc.

# Approach 3:ARCH



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Approach new to CEO pay, but not well described

Like approach #2, seems tied to TDC1 which is problematic

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What is  $\gamma$ ?

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
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
Which implies even lower elasticities than reported?

But, would a higher elasticity “confirm” the fundamental hypothesis?

# Would a higher elasticity confirm theory?




# Would a higher elasticity confirm theory?






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Suppose risky pay was layered on top of competitive pay

$E[\text{Pay}]$  and  $\text{Var}[\text{Pay}]$  both increase, but cannot reflect a compensating differential for increased risk

# Evidence of Layering (Murphy-Sandino 2020)

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Time-Lapse RSUs	$\beta = 1.476$
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$E[\text{Pay}]$  increases, but this cannot logically be a differential for increased risk

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I've suggested some “cleaning up”, but I believe the results will hold and will be compelling

